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The author's original mandate was to prepare "A Case for Unlimited Propa-
ganda," to oppose "A Case for Controlled Propaganda" in a "debate" with Professor
von Glahn. However, the author found it impossible to reconcile a case for un-
limited propaganda with existing international law and responsible foreign policies.
This paper will not support unlimited propaganda because it is impossible to recon-
cile such a concept with existing international legal obligations binding on all states.
Nor will it attempt to make a case for maximum freedom of international propa-
ganda based on some theory of the desirability of a competition of ideas from which
greater truth and understanding might result. Likewise eschewed in this paper is
any notion of "just" propaganda which, in virtue of some higher rights, should pre-
vail over the ordinary positive international law. Rather it will be the author's con-
tention that meaningful legal regulation of international propaganda is so difficult
at best and so inconceivable in the present divided world, that international law is not
well served by encouraging the belief among its supporters that substantial progress
in this problem area is imminent. On the other hand, it will be argued that there
are normative imperatives and practical necessities for directing the attention of
statesmen to their responsibilities and opportunities to contribute to patterns of
behavior leading to greater international legal control of propaganda.
This position will be substantiated, first, by an appraisal of existing international
law relevant to international propaganda and, second, by a brief summary of the basic
obstacles to more successful enforcement of the existing law and to the development
of additional law. In the discussion which follows stress will be placed upon the
view that "the international law of propaganda" is most profitably treated not as a
separate chapter of law but in the context of broader factual and legal categories.
First, as a phenomenon of international politics, propaganda will be treated as a
part of McDougal's "ideological instrument" which, together with the diplomatic,
economic, and military instruments constitute the principal means utilized in inter-
national politics.' The ideological instrument has been defined as follows:
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The use of the ideological instrument commonly involves the selective manipula-
tion and circulation of symbols, verbal or nonverbal, calculated to alter the patterns
of identifications, demands, and expectations of mass audiences in the target-state
and thereby to induce or stimulate politically significant attitudes and behavior
favorable to the initiator-state. It includes, in combination with other instruments,
all the techniques of propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and coup d'3tat which
have been refined and developed to such high efficiency as to have given rise to
repeated proposals to condemn their use for certain objectives as a distinct form or
mode of aggression.2
It is believed that both the differentiation of instruments within the over-all
arsenal of instruments of foreign policy and the identification of the use of propa-
ganda as an integral element within the broader concept of the ideological instrument
properly indicate the importance and complexity of efforts to bring propaganda under
international legal regulation.
Second, as a subject treated by international law, propaganda falls within the fol-
lowing categories:
(i) the law regulating the threat or use of force;
(2) the law governing dictatorial intervention (to the extent that such intervention
does not fall within the first category);
(3) the law of international responsibility for acts injurious to sovereign states
originating with another state's jurisdiction; and
(4) the corpus of positive legal obligations to promote world law, order, and
justice.
It is believed that existing functional international law relating to various means
of spreading propaganda-international communications law, for example-is most
usefully treated within the foregoing categories. It is artificial and comparatively
irrelevant to isolate the subject matter in primarily functional legal categories.
I
EXISTING LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA
There is no dearth of legal limitations on international propaganda. The hard
questions concern their meaning and their effectiveness. First, use of propaganda as
part of the ideological instrument is limited by the prohibition against the threat
or use of force embodied in article 11 (4) of the U.N. Charter and supported by an
overwhelming consensus expressed in legal documents since the time of the League
Covenant. Determination that use of warmongering propaganda violates the pre-
scription prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and
political independence of a state will presumably be made in the broader context of a
Id. at 29.
3 For a definition and discussion, see JoHN B. Wrrror; & A-THUR LARSoN, PROPAGANDA TOWARDS
DIsAi ENT IN THE WAR oN WoRDs IO, 62-82 (1964).
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finding that some of the other instruments--diplomatic, economic, military-are also
being used in a coordinated pattern of aggression. This brings us to one of the central
and seemingly insoluble problems of international law. Two things, however, are
clear:
First, the illegality of aggressive recourse to force in violation of article H (4)
is established beyond dispute. So great is the consensus on this point that it
remains the foundation for the existing minimum world public order despite all
violations of that order.
Second, the definition of aggression has thus far not been the product of the
application of formulae systematically arrived at in advance by authoritative
decision-makers. Rather, aggression has been defined case by case, primarily
through the process of claims and counterclaims predominantly by national entities
interacting either bilaterally or through the processes of international organiza-
tions. Efforts at more systematic and generally acceptable definitions of aggres-
sion have, notoriously, been thwarted by, among other things, ideological and
political differences and the reluctance of states to agree in advance to definitions
of aggression which might restrict them inordinately to the detriment of their
vital interests 4
In these circumstances, it would seem that students of international law and
relations should now turn to detailed studies of some of these cases wherein there
was a substantial consensus that aggression occurred and that use of the ideological
instrument constituted an important component of the aggressive behavior-for
example, the struggles in the Middle East and Malaysia, and Castro's machinations
in Latin America. It would seem that "practice" in the sense of international agree-
ments, resolutions, voeux, unilateral declarations, and the like, as it relates to the
problem of international propaganda has been substantially collected and analyzed by
Professors Whitton and Larson.5 What they have done in essence is to collect all of
the more formal evidences of states' practice on this subject much in the way that
Brownlie has surveyed this kind of practice with respect to the broader law regulating
resort to force.' What appears to be needed now is a closer and deeper look at that
more subtle "practice," the patterns of actual behavior emerging from the interna-
tional political process.
Next we must turn to the problem of indirect aggression, a necessarily vague
category which straddles the line between the law regulating recourse to armed
coercion and the law relating to essentially nonmilitary dictatorial intervention.
The ideological instrument usually assumes commanding importance in indirect
'McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note I, at 61-62; see generally Jm.sus STONE, AGGRESSION AND
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aggression. Indirect aggression is so termed because of ambiguity as to the relation-
ship of the alleged indirect aggressor to attacks by primarily nonmilitary or sub-
conventional military means against the territorial integrity and political independence
of another state and because of uncertainty as to whether the means employed, even
if they are traceable to the alleged indirect aggressor, constitute "the threat or use of
force." Despite obvious problems of definition and interpretation, it is clear that
international law presently recognizes and prohibits indirect aggression. It is equally
clear that subversive propaganda falls within this prohibition. Subversive propaganda
may therefore constitute an important element in the crime of indirect aggression
and contribute to a state of affairs warranting enforcement action by the United
Nations or, more likely, measures of individual and collective self-defense. Following
the logic of the concept of self-defense, a victim of indirect aggression would have
the right if it so desired to engage in otherwise prohibited propaganda against the
indirect aggressor 7
As in the determination that aggression has occurred, judgments about the pro-
priety of self-defense measures against alleged indirect aggression are usually made
on a case-by-case basis through the decentralized process of claims and counterclaims
by interested international persons. If more universal sources such as resolutions
in the U.N. or at regional conferences are persuasive authority that there is a crime
of indirect aggression, they are generally not too helpful in determining the content
in specific instances of the prohibited act. It again appears to be necessary to study
the evolving law on this subject through the collection and analysis of cases about
which interested parties and third parties have expressed an opinion. From such
studies guidelines for the evaluation of allegedly subversive propaganda and of
countermeasures of self-defense may emerge. Our experience with efforts to define
"aggression," "indirect aggression," and "intervention" suggests that this approach
may be more useful than that of attempting scientific codification of prescriptions
regulating indirect aggression generally and the international propaganda components
thereof.
Moving down the spectrum of international coercive measures as viewed from a
legal perspective, we come next to impermissible dictatorial intervention not amount-
ing to "the threat or use of force." The general principle of international law pro-
hibiting dictatorial intervention, reinforced by general and particular conventional
international law, as well as customary international law, prohibits dictatorial inter-
ference in the internal or external affairs of a state even when such interference does
not amount to the use or threat of force. A great part, perhaps the bulk, of interna-
tional propaganda of a patently unfriendly character falls into this category.
Legal regulation of propaganda of this kind presents a problem which thus far
7 On indirect aggression, see PAUL W. BLACESTOCK, STRATEGY OF SUBVERSION (1964); MANUEL R.
GtRCiA-MoRA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE AcTs OF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN
STATES (1962); I DANIEL P. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 328-31 (1965).
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has baffled international lawyers and statesmen. To an even greater extent than
in the case of the law regulating recourse to force, the universal agreement that
dictatorial intervention is illegal is vitiated by the problems of defining this delict
and of providing remedies for victims of illegal intervention.8 What little relief
is available to victims of illegal intervention seems generally to be of a political
zather than a legal character. The conviction that this is true leaves the author very
skeptical about the practical importance of the various ingenious suggestions of
Professors Whitton and Larson and others concerning the identification and legal
condemnation of technically illegal international propaganda.9
Closely related to the foregoing is the general international law of international
responsibility. It is clear that all states have an obligation to prevent the commission
of acts within their jurisdictions which endanger the territorial integrity and political
independence of sovereign states with which they are at peace. The rule goes far
in its requirements for responsibility for private as well as public acts originating in
its jurisdiction. A particularly well-established corollary of this rule requires sup-
pression of, and responsibility for, revolutionary expeditions and so-called terrorist
plots and activities aimed at another state. Given the well-known importance of
propaganda in modern international relations, it is as illegal for a state to condone or
encourage warmongering, subversive, and, in some cases, defamatory propaganda
against another state as to contribute bases and materiel to an aggressive invader.
Having said this, however, we must face the same problems of enforcement already
mentioned. Responsibility for delictual propaganda is clear; practical remedies must
depend upon the more or less fortuitous functioning of international organization and
the possibilities for permissible measures of self-help.
Moreover, the rifts and confficts of our era have notoriously eroded the traditional
concepts of "peace" and "friendly" relations. The facts of the several existing cold
wars collide head-on with the underlying assumptions and goals of the traditional
law of international responsibility. For this reason and in view of the difficulties of
obtaining enforcement of the law regulating international conflict and intervention,
this paper will not examine in detail the functional law relating to international
communications and other subjects touching international propaganda which are well
set forth by Professors Whitton and Larson in their book and in their contributions to
this volume. °
Last, we must acknowledge that in addition to the prescriptions limiting the use
of propaganda as part of delictual recourse to force or dictatorial intervention there
are equally important obligations on all nations to promote the goals of peace,
' Burke, Legal Regulation of Minor Coercion, in EssAYs IN INTERVENTION 97 (Stanger ed. 1964).
ITnoN & LARsON 183-273.
"0 Larson, The Present Status of Propaganda in International Law, pp. 439-51 supra; Whitton, The
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cooperation, pacific settlement of disputes, international economic and social justice,
and disarmament. These obligations both reinforce the prescriptions against war-
mongering, subversive, and defamatory propaganda and oblige states to make positive
contributions to the realization of these goals through, inter alia, the propaganda
policies they pursue.11
In summary, therefore, no state or individual purporting to respect international
law could contend that there is an unlimited right to engage in international propa-
ganda. It should be emphasized that this in itself is a sign of progress. The same
statement could not have been made with equal confidence in, say, x914. In any
event, the issue is not whether international law should regulate propaganda but how.
One's answer naturally is determined by one's picture of the international law-making
process. Some international law writers, confronted with the widespread violation
of the norms summarized above, see the problem as one of codification and develop-
ment of relevant rules and legal institutions. Without discounting the importance
of such efforts, it is the contention of this paper that the more realistic and ultimately
more fruitful approach to the problem is to proceed in the following manner:
(i) study the claims, counterclaims, and third-party judgments of controversial
instances of recourse to propaganda as part of the ideological instrument;
(2) seek points of consensus, however modest, with respect to the customary
law relevant to international propaganda and the ideological instrument;
(3) study the degree of effectiveness of controversial uses of the ideological
instrument in order to determine forms or circumstances of its use that appear to
have been ineffectual or disproportionately mischievous and hence the more in-
defensible in that they involved violation of the law without a commensurate
selfish gain. It is always useful to buttress arguments based on normative
obligation with utilitarian arguments of self-interest and there is reason to
believe that, in the tricky field of propaganda, law and self-interest properly
perceived may be much closer than proponents of dubious forms of psychological
warfare would have us believe 12
(4) seek to convince decision-makers that their policies concerning the use of
the ideological instrument should be based, first, on an awareness of their legal
obligations and their opportunity to contribute to the development of interna-
tional law rather than on their knowledge that sanctions underlying the law
relating to propaganda are virtually nonexistent and that violations of the law
can be expected to continue. Second, proponents of international law should
seek to persuade decision-makers that there are grave dangers in irresponsible
recourse to the ideological instrument and positive benefits in responsible policies
with regard to propaganda.
11 See U.N. CunTER arts. i, 2, for the fundamental basis for these international obligations.
12 See BLAcs.srocK, op. tit. supra note 7.
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To the extent that such efforts are successful in nations such as the United States,
international practice tending to produce customary international law will improve.
To the extent that such practice may educate other states which presently indulge
in unlimited propaganda and, possibly, induce more responsible behavior, the
basis may be laid for more systematic efforts for codification and development of
rules and institutions for control of international propaganda. As indicated at the
outset, however, it is believed that the prospects for meaningful progress in this
field are modest and that a very conservative attitude should be taken in appraising
the scope and effectiveness of universal and even regional international law as it
bears upon the problem of international propaganda. Let us, then, examine some
of the reasons which support this conservative analysis.
II
OBSTACLES To THE DEVELOPMNT OF MEANINGFUL INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA
The most fundamental obstacle to regulation of international propaganda results
from philosophic-ideological rifts which divide the world. Men differ profoundly
on the definition of ultimate reality and, consequently, on the interpretation of human
events. Granted that the problems of international propaganda relate as much to its
effects as to its truthfulness, truthfulness is still the starting point in any evaluation
of propaganda. But we know that there exist a number of fundamentally different
approaches to the quest for ultimate truth. Two have particularly influenced con-
temporary history, the Judaeo-Christian and the Marxist-Leninist worldviews. As
we know, these differences are far from academic since they influence the thoughts
and actions of governing elites and substantial portions of the citizenry in the world's
major powers. If we add the factor of missionary zeal which is present in both
camps we have a situation that would seem to defy efforts to obtain global con-
sensus on regulation of propaganda which is vital to the propagation of each side's
version of "truth."
For example, even if we remove the traditional communist words of scorn (for
examples, "feudal oppression," "exploiters," "warlords," and "lackeys") from the
communist propaganda attacks quoted by Professors Whitton and Larson, 13 the
underlying core of the message is "true" when viewed from a communist perspective.
To predict the collapse of the present political system in Iran would appear, from
a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, to be as scientific and objective as a prediction by a
psychiatrist that an individual was destined for mental illness. On the other hand,
one need not be a Kremlinologist or Pekinologist to predict that conspicuous repre-
sentatives of the Judaeo-Christian worldview will probably not fare very well under
Marxist-Leninist regimes and that serious threats to their lives, property, and human
11 WnirroN & LAR ON 91-92.
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rights are a distinct possibility. Propaganda reflecting this point of view is certainly
"true," but it may also be "warmongering," "subversive," or "defamatory." The
same can be said of Western propaganda of a positive kind which asserts that man
can only prosper in societies that conform to God's law-or perhaps to the secular
principles of a free society.
At this point, of course, the proponents of control of international propaganda
turn to their municipal law analogies of libel, slander, treason, and the like and
remind us that such limitations on free expression arise not solely or even primarily
out of a concern for truth but out of the need to suppress breaches of the public
order that may result from the exercise of the right of expression. Thus the truth-
fulness of a statement may not redeem its antisocial or illegal effects. We might then
conclude that, drawing by analogy from this concept, states holding different views
about the meaning of "truth" should restrain themselves from expressing these views
in ways that patently disturb the world public order.14
The difficulty here is that these fundamentally different views of reality divide
nations in their attitudes toward the world public order. The law-makers and
acquiescing citizens who decide that in certain circumstances the national public order
is a higher value than freedom of expression obviously agree substantially that the
existing order is desirable and worth protecting. Do we have anything like this
consensus with respect to the world public order? Most authorities seem to think not.
Increasingly we encounter expressions such as "the law of minimum world public
order"' 5 or "the international law of coexistence" which is contrasted with "'universal'
and 'regional' law of cooperation."'"
The well-known conclusion that such modern authorities reach is that, despite
the obstacles to a true world public order, a minimum world public order can and in
fact does exist. It is based, in effect, on a tacit agreement to disagree but to avoid
expressing the disagreement in ways that would be disadvantageous if not ruinous
for all. This means in practice that the form of the world public order and the
content of universal international law is determined more or less pragmatically
and often informally or tacitly rather than by systematic agreement from a basic
consensus. Consequently, the value attached to this minimum world public order
and to any particular rules relating to its maintenance tends to be variable. Whereas
judgments about the comparative value of a domestic public order and freedom of
expression taking forms that threaten that order would presumably lead toward
protection of the domestic order, the same assumption cannot necessarily be made
with respect to the relationship between the world public order and international
propaganda.
It would appear, then, that the normative imperative requiring some limitation on
24 Ibid.
'-5 McDouGAL & FELucuxo, op. cit. supra note i.
" WOLFAG G. FxiEmAN, THn CHANGING STRUCT'uRE OF INTERNATiONAL LAW (x964).
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international propaganda arises not from a consensus over what natural law thinkers
call "the international common good" but from the pragmatic necessities of co-
existence in a dangerous world of conflict. Thus, propaganda that threatens to incite
World War III would be judged impermissible-indeed, criminal-by all responsible
members of the minimum world public order, whatever their ideological persuasion.
But less dangerous propaganda which thwarted progress in arms control and dis-
armament and pacific settlement of disputes might be considered permissible because
its alleged truth and its ideological-political necessity outweighed the propagandists'
concern for the minimum world public order.
A second obstacle to significant legal regulation of international propaganda arises
from the fact that the deep-rooted differences just discussed, along with other causes,
produce persistent and widespread international conflict. Conflict and drastic
change are endemic to the contemporary world society and to most national societies.
Separate from, even though often arising out of or influenced by, the fundamental
rifts just discussed, there is an ethos of change in most of the world. This ethos
encourages "ends-justify-the-means" attitudes which have little or nothing in com-
mon with the attitudes of law-makers and citizens in advanced legal orders which
place sophisticated limitations on freedom of expression in the interests of the com-
monweal.
The intermingling of political and ideological activity both within and between
existing states that characterizes our time clearly diminishes respect for public
orders at all levels-from local to national to global. The statesmen who developed
rules of international law prohibiting hostile acts originating within a state's juris-
diction and having effect within the jurisdiction of a friendly power were content
with their own public order and sufficiently content with the public orders of most
of the other states so that they could support a norm that valued order and stability
over violent change. Mutual respect, protection of vital interests, and nonintervention
were the rule in that world. Thus the British representatives at the Alabama Claims
Arbitration came to see that a mischievous source of revolutionary change ought to
be discouraged by a rule prohibiting even tacit encouragement of support to those
in rebellion against a friendly power.17
But the revolutionary elite that establishes a new state or takes over an old
one is generally not at all disposed to respect the rights of other, quite differently
organized and oriented, public orders. Indeed, such revolutionaries often fear, detest,
and seek to destroy their neighbors' public orders. In any event, for these revolu-
tionary elites order, stability, and mutual respect of sovereigns are all values that are
subordinate to the highest of all values, rapid and decisive change. Since propa-
ganda is the most important and most available instrument of such elites there is
" ThoMS A. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORy OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 409 (5th ed. 1955); PERCY
E. CORBETr, LAw IN DIPLOMACY 153 (I959).
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(from their standpoint) both a normative and practical right and duty to use propa-
ganda in their assaults on "unjust" public orders-local, national, regional, global.
In addition to these fundamental forces working against respect for order in our
age, there is the resultant impact of psychological and sociological characteristics of
individuals and groups which bring about conffict and change. Attitudes and
habits of expression and behavior are developed which are shocking to the supporters
of the status quo. Thus, as we view the attitudes, language, and tactics of various
advocates for change in American society we are not encouraged to believe that the
world community is ready for an early return to a public order based on mutual
respect and good manners. Nor are we likely to find more genuine enthusiasm for
legal restraints on propaganda than exists within domestic activist groups for stricter
rules regulating strikes, sit-ins, boycotts, and demonstrations in defiance of public
order.
There are, then, in the new or transformed nations, many elites-some enjoying
strong popular support-who believe that they have an unlimited right to lash out
against all that they see as wrong in the world. They further assume the necessity
and rectitude of preserving their own systems and of advancing their political in-
terests and ideological causes through the use of the ideological instrument, their
strongest instrument of foreign policy.
INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA
AND ri PRACTICE OF STATES
In the light of the foregoing considerations it is not surprising that, despite wide-
spread adhesion to conventions explicitly or implicitly condemning warmongering,
subversive, and defamatory propaganda,"" despite extensive formal and informal
discussions of the problems some of which have produced draft conventions and
codes on the subject, 9 and despite the tremendous volume of charges and protests
which specifically acknowledge the relevant legal prescriptions and apply them to
the policies of other states, 20 all states appear to engage in propaganda activities which
could be termed legally impermissible. To the extent that it is normatively binding,
international law ultimately rests upon a feeling of obligation on the part of its
subjects to obey it. Or, to use McDougal's formulation, international law rests upon
" See, e.g., the International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace,
Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 3o(H) (1936) (effective April 2, 1938), 32 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 113
(1938).
" See, e.g., Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the Inter-
national Law Commission in 195r, U.N. Doc. No. A/1858, A/CN.4/ 4 8, ch. 4, 45 Amt. J. INT'L L. Supp.
123, 128 [arts. 2(5), 2(6)]; Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, U.N. OFFIcE OF PonLIC IN-
FoEmA-oN, EvEnvrm's UNrrED NATIoNs x85 9. (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1952.J.9), and Draft Convention
on the International Right of Correction, 5952 U.N. YEARBooK 463-65 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 19531.30.
1o See WmrroTN & LAE5oe x2-x8o passim; Whitton, Propaganda and International Law, 72 HtaOU
REcInL 545-59 (948); 1 O'CONNELL, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 329-31.
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the "expectations" of authoritative decision-makers about the behavior of states that
purport to be acting legally.2 1 As one deduces obvious corollaries concerning interna-
tional propaganda from relevant functional international law, from the law regu-
lating recourse to force, dictatorial intervention, and international responsibility, and
from the law enjoining states to support world public order, what are one's expecta-
tions ?
It is submitted that expectations are, first, for only intermittent, variable and
marginal observance of these legal prescriptions. But, perhaps more important,
one anticipates that the states as they violate these norms do not appear to be conscious
of doing wrong. In many instances, on the contrary, states manifestly engage in
technically illegal propaganda with a feeling of rectitude ranging from a conviction
that they have a right to disseminate their propaganda to the belief that they have
a duty to do so in the interests of mankind as well as for their own interests. Until
this kind of attitude is altered it would seem impossible successfully to deal with the
problems of international legal regulation of propaganda.
There is a further aspect of this problem, moreover, that is more difficult to prove.
One wonders whether, notwithstanding the repeated acknowledgments in this
century of the potency and dangers of international propaganda (so well catalogued
in Professors Whitton and Larson22), the widespread tendency to ignore prescriptions
limiting propaganda may result in part from a failure of statesmen to take the prob-
lem seriously. Have the words that statesmen have uttered, written, and endorsed
with binding adhesions really penetrated their consciences so as to have effect when
those statesmen make their policy decisions? Does the very subtlety of propaganda as
a means of coercion result in its use without the kind of crisis of conscience which
presumably would precede a decision to employ more direct forms of coercion, such
as the economic or military instruments of foreign policy?
Concern over this possible explanation for the gap between law and practice
relating to international propaganda is obviously particularly acute among those of
us whose hopes for the development of a minimum world public order rests more
with responsible decision-makers who contribute good examples and potential
precedents than with drafters of codes and participants in international conventions.
The point of hope is not the outraged victim for whom little remedy other than
retaliation in kind is presently available. Rather, hope for improved state practice
in the matter of propaganda lies with potential senders of propaganda who must be
made aware of the importance and legal implications of the use that they make of
propaganda. But the first requirement of this approach obviously is a clear recogni-
tion by responsible decision-makers that there is both a practical and a legal problem.
At the risk of inviting charges of parochialism, it must be submitted at this point
21 Se, e.g., McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGun
REc tm I37, 170-71 (1958); McDouGAL & FELiCiAro, op. cit supra note i, at 45-49.
" WmrroN & LsoN 1-52.
6oo LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
that United States decision-makers seem, on the whole, to have understood that there
is a problem. The protests of Americans who would have the United States take
the ideological offensive are a measure of the reluctance of this country to engage
in propaganda that could be termed impermissible under international law. Yet
this is a never-ending problem, and a good record to date does not preclude the
possibility that a nation as sorely tested as the United States has been and will be
might be tempted to experiment with the potent and dangerous possibilities of legally
impermissible propaganda. Those who advocate restraint in the use of the ideological
instrument, therefore, should constantiy urge upon their government the necessity
of keeping this problem in mind and of dealing with it responsibly 3
For the problems of international propaganda will not, it is believed, be sub-
stantially alleviated in the foreseeable future as a result of clearer definitions of crimes,
rights, and duties or by new legal rules or ingenious attempts to provide sanctions
to enforce the old ones. The essence of the problem is that, on the one hand, the
ideological instrument is too valuable to contemporary international actors and too
complex and that, on the other, community consensus is too lacking for the successful
employment of sophisticated approaches borrowed from advanced legal orders.
The path to progress-and it promises to be very, very slow-lies in studying the
realities of our divided world and in seeing how they can be gradually influenced
and alleviated by enlightened, generally unilateral, contributions to minimum world
public order in so far as international propaganda and the broader ideological in-
strument are concerned.
" Two of the most persuasive conservative views on this subject are L. JoHN MntTmN, INTERNATIONAL
PROPAGANDA (1958), esp. 107-08, and Jusaus STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 3X8-23
(1954).
